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Abstract
Extending the literature on institutional voids, we introduce theory from law that
highlights the ability of firms to choose the laws and enforcement mechanisms
that govern their international joint ventures (IJVs). Specifically, firms may
overcome institutional voids by borrowing institutions via binding international
commercial arbitration (BICA) rather than relying on host-market institutions.
Leveraging an institution-based view, we develop a theoretical framework to
articulate the conditions underwhich IJV partnersmay choose BICA as opposed to
domestic courts to overcome institutional voids in host markets.
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INTRODUCTION
A leading proposition in the institution-based view suggests that
‘‘institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver
as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy’’ (Ingram &
Silverman, 2002: 20). The cross-border setting intensifies these
struggles because multinational enterprises (MNEs), especially
those interested in joint ventures (JVs) with local firms, may face
formal institutions in host markets that are not sufficiently
developed (Luo, 2001). In other words, firms may face institutional
voids—defined as the failure of market-supporting and contract-
enforcement institutions to efficiently facilitate exchange between
firms (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Overcoming institutional voids,
firms on the one hand can rely on informal institutions in host
markets to partially substitute for the lack of effective formal
institutions (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot,
2010). On the other hand, better market-supporting formal insti-
tutions may develop in host markets (North, 1990; Peng, 2003).
However, are there other ways to overcome institutional voids in
host markets? Can international joint venture (IJV) partners opt
out of the problematic institutional framework of host markets
altogether?
We address these questions by integrating theory from law, a
discipline that is not often leveraged in international business (IB)
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(Cheng, Guo, & Skousen, 2011; Lan & Heracleous,
2010). In the context of market entries via IJVs, the
laws underlying the contract and its enforcement
are critical (Beamish & Lupton, 2016; Lumineau &
Malhotra, 2011; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). The IB
literature frames such contracting around an
assumption that we identify as ‘‘one law, one court
in one country.’’ Specifically, the contracts litera-
ture underlying IJV research assumes that one
domestic law applies to the IJV, and that the
contract will be enforced in the domestic courts
of the host country. In turn, IJV partners would be
forced to cope with any institutional voids of the
host country. We contribute to this literature by
offering a mechanism for IJV partners to overcome
institutional voids through institutional borrowing—
the explicit use of institutions from outside the
domestic institutional environment. We focus on
one such mechanism from legal theory. Specifi-
cally, international disputes may be resolved
through public ordering via domestic courts or a
hybrid of public and private ordering via binding
international commercial arbitration (BICA) (Dra-
hozal, 2009). BICA is a legally binding dispute
resolution process that substitutes for domestic
courts.1 By introducing BICA, a widely accepted
institution that substitutes for domestic courts, we
begin to challenge the traditional contracts
assumption of ‘‘one law, one court in one country’’
underlying the IJV literature.
In other words, IJV partners do not have to rely
on domestic courts in the host market for their
enforcement mechanisms (Siegel, 2009). Specifi-
cally, legal theory suggests that BICA allows foreign
MNEs and host firms to specify laws that apply to
IJV contracts (beyond host country laws), and tailor
their enforcement mechanisms to their needs
(Davidson, 2010; Drahozal, 2009). In turn, this
may allow some (although not all) IJV partners to
embed strong institutions in IJV contract by choos-
ing to include BICA, while performing the contrac-
tual duties in host countries with institutional
voids.
We focus on the ex ante enforcement decision
between a foreign MNE and a host firm engaging in
IJV negotiations.2 This is a critical stage of IJV
formation when partners negotiate the remedy for
possible enforcement complications (Reuer &
Arin˜o, 2007). Institutional differences between the
foreign MNE’s home market and the host market
often magnify the transaction costs and emphasize
the need for mutually agreed-upon enforcement
mechanisms (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Enforcement
mechanisms, in turn, have implications for IJV
performance, durability, and survival. In part, this
is because IJVs have the advantage of strong
internal alignment features that are often comple-
mented by external enforcement mechanisms
(Beamish & Lupton, 2016; Dhanaraj & Beamish,
2009). For most IJV partners, the inclusion of
arbitration clauses in IJV contracts is paramount.
Conservative estimates of the ex ante inclusion of
arbitration clauses in IJV contracts is around 85%
(Drahozal, 2009; Mistelis, 2013). One rationale
behind this effect is the shifting importance of
the IJV and the motivations of partners (Reuer &
Arin˜o, 2007; Siegel, 2009). Another rationale con-
cerns the uncertainty in the exit process in an IJV—
exit can take very different forms ranging from
liquidation to acquisition of a partner’s share
(Beamish & Lupton, 2016). Thus concerns over
exit processes from the IJV and enforcement may
thus be key in the selection of BICA over domestic
courts. Yet we lack theory on why IJV partners
choose BICA over the default, domestic court
enforcement option in their ex ante discussions,
thus calling for additional research.
When forming the IJV in an environment of
institutional voids, enforcement is crucial (Khanna
& Palepu, 2010; Siegel, 2009). Given the impor-
tance of the IJV relationship and the ability of the
partner firms to exit the IJV, it is fruitful to ask:
What are the conditions that will make it beneficial
for firms to choose BICA when engaged in IJVs?
According to transaction cost economics (TCE),
(domestic) arbitration helps reduce transaction
costs in many settings, such as contractual incom-
pleteness, specialized governance, and expertise in
‘‘filling the [contractual] gaps’’ (Williamson, 1975:
75–77, 1985: 34). These discussions tend to take
place within a domestic context, where the assump-
tion of ‘‘one law, one court in one country’’
naturally makes sense (Argyres & Mayer, 2007;
Lumineau & Oxley, 2012; Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Weber & Mayer, 2011; Zhou et al., 2014). Given
that the assumption no longer holds in a cross-
border setting, firms engaged in IJVs have a unique
opportunity to decide between domestic courts and
BICA (Drahozal, 2006; Drahozal & Ware, 2010;
Kapeliuk, 2012).
We develop a theoretical framework to argue that
IJV partners can overcome institutional voids via
BICA because they can borrow institutions. Funda-
mentally, firms’ choice of BICA may support the IJV
even when formal institutions in a host market are
not effective (Drahozal, 2009; Mistelis, 2013).
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Highlighting a theory of borrowing institutions
that allows IJV partners to overcome institutional
voids, this article endeavors to make three contri-
butions. First, leveraging legal theory, we identify a
gap in the assumption of ‘‘one law, one court in one
country’’ in the contracts literature on cross-border
exchanges. We argue that relaxing the assumption
of choice of dispute resolution mechanisms (en-
forcement mechanisms) presents an underexplored
pathway for facilitating IJV relationships by reduc-
ing cross-border transaction costs. Second, we
contribute to the discussion on institutional bor-
rowing as a mechanism for overcoming institu-
tional voids by showing that BICA helps IJV
partners overcome institutional voids of enforce-
ment. Given BICA’s multilateral institutional frame-
work, we argue that the joint efforts of 152
countries support enforcement outside the scope
of domestic courts in one host country. Third, we
explore the boundaries that may provide a more
nuanced approach to our theory of institutional
borrowing with a focus on IJV partners’ choice of
BICA in light of institutional voids, search and
negotiation costs, and partner constraints. Ulti-
mately by focusing on a specific institution (BICA)
and the ability to overcome institutional voids, we
contribute to the institution-based view (Meyer &
Peng, 2016; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009) by
showing how institutions matter.
BICA AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS
When firms engage in IJVs, they are susceptible to
institutional differences (Henisz & Zelner, 2005;
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Peng
et al., 2009). Institutional differences magnify the
effects of inefficiencies in market exchanges and
emphasize the need for enforcement mechanisms
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002).3 IJV partners may engage in
a cost-benefit analysis balancing informal and
formal arrangements in their relationship (Peng,
2003). This analysis is critical for IJVs (Meyer et al.,
2009). When the transaction environment is uncer-
tain, more contingency planning is necessary
(Williamson, 1985). One stream of research sug-
gests that under high uncertainty firms may have
intricate contracts with more contingency plan-
ning (Williamson, 1985). Another stream posits the
opposite: under high environmental dynamism
(Dess & Beard, 1984), firms may be more likely to
forego the elaborate planning for long and complex
contracts and engage in short-term, underdevel-
oped contracts as they proceed with some degree of
flexibility (Li et al., 2008; Mayer & Argyres, 2004;
Zhou et al., 2008). Thus there may be an inherent
tension between enforcement uncertainty and the
default choice of domestic courts versus BICA.
Enforcement Costs
When negotiating the IJV contract, the foreign
MNE and the host firm engage in a forward-looking
cost-benefit analysis to help determine the contin-
gencies and specifications (Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Williamson, 1985). One area is potentially high
enforcement costs of the IJV contract should a
dispute arise. Generally, when IJV partners can
significantly reduce the uncertainty surrounding
enforcement costs, they are likely to choose the
enforcement mode that provides for the most
predictability. Choosing BICA over domestic courts
may create additional enforcement benefits, such
as (1) expertise, (2) time (urgency), (3) confiden-
tiality, and (4) potentially most important, pre-
dictability of outcomes (Williamson, 1985: 70–71).
First, the costs of expertise (calling experts and
expert testimony) are likely to be high in conflicts
between IJV partners. The need to for expert
witnesses and expert consulting is a fundamental
shortcoming of domestic courts (Williamson, 1985:
70–71). BICA may overcome this shortcoming,
because firms may select arbitrators who already
possess the necessary expertise (Kapeliuk, 2012).
This will save the IJV partners on the typically high
expert costs (in addition to search costs associated
with locating experts) (Heuman, 2003; Redfern
et al., 2009; Williamson, 1985: 70–71). Therefore
this is an advantage of BICA (Heuman, 2003;
Redfern et al., 2009).
In domestic courts, the foreign MNE partner
must try to find local experts or import foreign
experts, which may generate travel and coordina-
tion expenses. Moreover, trade standards and other
areas of expertise vary tremendously among coun-
tries, and foreign experts may introduce uncer-
tainty surrounding expert testimony in domestic
courts (Berkowitz, Moenius, & Pistor, 2004). Legal
theory suggests that experts are less necessary when
the underlying product is simple or standardized
(Berkowitz et al., 2004; Drahozal, 2009). However,
when experts are necessary, the foreign MNE may
bear the majority of the enforcement costs in terms
of coordination and travel.
BICA allows the IJV partners to choose arbitrators
with specific expertise. This may provide more
control over the expert costs. For instance, the
foreign MNE may mitigate costs by appointing an
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arbitrator with sufficient expert knowledge (thus
combining arbitrator fees with expert fees). While
arbitrators are not always industry experts, they
tend to be more industry savvy than domestic
judges (Benson, 1999; Drahozal, 2009).
Second, IJV partners often seek timely resolution
of their conflict. While there is a wide variation in
domestic courts for contract enforcement timelines,
in 2014 the worldwide average time to a decision was
1 year and 9 months (Ease of Doing Business, 2015).
In contrast, the average arbitration institute takes
about 8 months through normal channels. IJV
partners may also expedite the BICA process. A
special category of BICA includes expedited proceed-
ings, which have specific guidelines and a set time
table designed for time-sensitive disputes (Heuman,
2003; Redfern et al., 2009). An expedited BICA
enjoys all the protections and benefits of BICA, but
attaches a time requirement for resolution. The
timelines for expedited proceedings can be as short
as 3 days (!), as long as 3 months, but on average
45 days. BICA emphasizes speed and accuracy, an
emphasis absent in domestic court systems where
the expedited process is unavailable (Heuman,
2003; Redfern et al., 2009). For IJV partners where
a decision is urgent, the costs associated with delays
in the typically slow domestic court systems may be
exceedingly high. BICA can alleviate these enforce-
ment costs, and is even more attractive when
decisions are urgent (Table 1).
Third, confidentiality is an important issue for
conflicts over intellectual property (IP). One of the
advantages of IJVs is that firms can access confi-
dential information and knowledge in partner
firms (Beamish & Lupton, 2016). However, these
arrangements have shortcomings when the IJV
partners disagree about how to treat information
and knowledge. For instance, the rights protecting
trade secrets may be extinguished when confiden-
tiality is broken (Williamson, 1985) and are not
recognized in many domestic courts around the
world. For this reason, ensuring confidentiality is
extremely important to firms due to the high cost
of lost IP protection. In addition, confidentiality
may carry implications for the liability of foreign-
ness (Zaheer, 1995). Because the losing firm may be
publicly shamed, and the public nature of domestic
court proceedings may make domestic courts reluc-
tant to rule against host firms, especially when such
firms are national icons (Li, 2009).
Fourth, the bulk of enforcement costs lies in the
predictability of outcomes. There are at least two
dimensions: (1) the amount of the outcome (spec-
ified in dollars or performance) and (2) the costs of
the resolution process (court, administrative, and
lawyer costs) (Stephenson, 2009). Setting the costs
for BICA will be one of the first scheduled decisions
by the arbitrators or may be assessed by a standing
body prior to the formation of the arbitral tribunal
(Heuman, 2003; Redfern et al., 2009). The benefits
Table 1 Court and binding international commercial arbitration: a comparison
Court Arbitration
International
Aspects
‘‘Home court’’ advantage
Multiple jurisdictions with different outcomes possible
Divergent laws may apply
One proceeding under the law decided by the parties
Procedure and arbitrator can be selected to be neutral
of law, language, and culture of the parties
Technical Decision-maker (the judge or the jury) may lack expertise Party discretion to choose arbitrators with necessary
expertise
Urgency, Time Procedures are often drawn out
Injunctive relief may be limited
Extensive discovery
Shortened procedures
Expedited procedure available
Injunctive or interim award available
Finality Multiple appeals possible Limited appeal of decision
Confidentiality Public proceedings limit confidentiality
Outcome often public record
Proceeding and award are private and confidential
Costs Penalties and fees are unpredictable
Outcome may depend on a body of peers
Fees relate directly to amount sought for award
Arbitrator fee defined up front or stipulated by
institutional body
Advantages Public scrutiny, many administrative costs borne by the
court, many stages for review of decision (appeals)
Costs are predictable, confidentiality, procedural
flexibility, time efficiency, mobility of final award
Disadvantages Unpredictable costs, long time to final decision, no decision
mobility across borders, home court advantages
High administrative costs (especially at outset), limited
appeals, limited public scrutiny
Note: Adapted from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, www.wipo.int), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC, www.sccinstitute.
com), and International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, www.iccwbo.org).
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of predictable arbitrator fees and administrative
costs greatly reduce uncertainty for the partners.
Since BICA allows the IJV partners to use their
existing lawyers (not local lawyers often mandated
by the domestic courts), lawyer fees are likely to be
less when compared with domestic courts (Heye,
2004; Lapre`s, 2009; Li, 2009).
Overall, BICA may thus be attractive in locations
suffering from high enforcement costs. Table 2
presents a direct comparison between the costs (as
a percent of the claim) associated with domestic
courts and BICA by region. In every region, BICA
represents the lower cost option. It is not surprising
that IJV partners often endeavor to include BICA
clauses in IJV contracts to address the ex ante
concerns with enforcement costs. When enforce-
ment costs are high, the choice of BICA may
become much more attractive in the IJV. In
summary:
Proposition 1: As enforcement costs increase,
firms forming an IJV are more likely to engage in
institutional borrowing by choosing binding
international commercial arbitration as opposed
to domestic courts in the host country of the
MNE.
Going above and beyond Proposition 1, next we
develop a contingency model (see Figure 1) to
highlight the factors that intensify the relationship
discussed in Proposition 1. The positive relation-
ship between enforcement costs and arbitration
grounds our model given our emphasis on BICA as
an enforcement mechanism that substitutes for
domestic courts (Proposition 1). Notably, this is a
competing model, and when IJV partners choose
BICA they cannot choose domestic courts. We
expect that institutional voids in the host market
will increase the positive relationship between
enforcement costs and the choice of BICA (Propo-
sition 2). In addition, high search and negotiation
costs will further increase the positive relationship
between enforcement costs and the choice of BICA
(Proposition 3). Finally, the development of our
institutional borrowing perspective draws on an IJV
context. IJVs vary widely, and we have tailored IJV
characteristics that may increase the positive rela-
tionship between enforcement costs and the choice
of BICA over domestic courts.4
INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS
Institutional voids represent a major concern for
IJV partners in host markets with weak institutions
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Enforcement of the IJV
contract will be at the forefront of their concerns in
ex ante discussions. Even in strong institutional
environments, discussion of the adoption of BICA
in IJVs tends to be a priority (Reuer & Arin˜o, 2007).
When enforcement institutions are weak in the
host market, the IJV partners are likely to look for
adjudication mechanisms elsewhere—in other
words, institutional borrowing.
A common institutional void relating to enforce-
ment is the formalization of urgency. While the IJV
partners may wish a quick resolution to move
forward with their relationship or to exit the IJV,
the domestic courts are often mired in expansive
court cases and long-time horizon decision pro-
cesses. Reputation and other non-market costs may
be tied-up in these domestic disputes. Legal theory
suggests that the length of time to resolve a dispute
directly relates to the uncertainty surrounding the
outcome. Moreover, host markets that suffer from
long timelines tend to have the compounding
problem of more (rather than less) filings in the
court. For example, in 2002, India amended its civil
code to improve the speed for decisions in the high
courts. Locations that adopted the procedural rules
saw fewer (rather than more) contractual breach
claims and increased investment (Chemin, 2012).
However, the effects were not uniform in India,
emphasizing how formal institutional changes may
fail to effectively overcome voids in a host market.
Thus where institutional voids around enforce-
ment urgency are present, enforcement costs for
Table 2 Average domestic court costs and BICA costs as a percentage of claim
Region East Asia and
Pacific (%)
Europe and Central
Asia (%)
Latin America and
Caribbean (%)
Middle East and North
Africa (%)
South Asia
(%)
Sub-Saharan
Africa (%)
Domestic Court 48.8 26.2 30.8 24.7 30.5 44.9
BICA 30.1 23.7 28.9 10.0 28.5 33.6
Note: Adapted from the Ease of Doing Business survey from 2015 (www.doingbusiness.org), International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (https://icsid.worldbank.org), and International Chamber of Commerce (www.iccwbo.org). Amounts estimated from a theoretical average of
100,000 and 500,000 USD claims using three arbitrators.
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the IJV partners may increase, making BICA more
attractive.
For example, some IJVs may be formed on access
to trade secrets and the advantage in the market-
facing activities in the host market that the trade
secrets provide. However, trade secrets are not
universally recognized, manifesting in a salient
institutional void. When submitting to a domestic
court that does not recognize trade secrets, the IJV
partners risk extinguishing the trade secret in other
locations (not just the host market) should the
court choose to reveal the secret. Other issues with
confidentiality may relate to non-financial costs
such as loss of reputation or even legitimacy. For
instance, foreign MNEs tend to be in a weak
position to manage and handle media attention
in host markets relative to the host firm (Stevens,
Xie, & Peng, 2016). The lack of confidentiality may
provide host market media with an opportunity to
bring the dispute to the public, potentially under-
mining the reputation of foreign MNEs. However,
IJV partners may avoid these costs of enforcement
if they engage in a confidential enforcement pro-
cess such as BICA.
The predictability of costs associated with
enforcement of decisions in locations with institu-
tional voids tends to be low. In general, the number
of disputes in BICA that arise from locations with
weak institutions provides a conservative proxy for
the choice of BICA when IJV partners confront
rising enforcement costs associated with institu-
tional voids. This makes it difficult to ascertain the
extent to which these firms choose BICA in general.
However, we can count the outcomes of the choice
of BICA related to the location (institutionally
strong or weak). Consider Table 3, which reports
aggregate statistics about the breakdown of BICA in
the major arbitration institutes. Except at Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) in Sweden, the
majority of BICA cases adjudicated in the other
locations involve parties from weak institutional
environments. Overall, BICA tends to facilitate a
large number of dispute resolutions with host firms
from weak institutional environments. In
summary:
Proposition 2: Institutional voids of the host
market intensifies institutional borrowing for
firms forming an IJV to choose binding interna-
tional commercial arbitration as opposed to
domestic courts in the host country of the MNE.
CROSS-BORDER SEARCH AND
NEGOTATION COSTS
Following Williamson (1985), we recognize cross-
border transaction costs may manifest in two
categories in addition to the enforcement costs
discussed above: (1) search costs and (2) negotia-
tion costs. As a caveat, prior work investigating
cross-border transaction costs along these cate-
gories emphasized the general costs (but not the
legal costs) associated with the IJV relationship
(Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). Building on Hennart (1989)
and Williamson (1985), we focus on search and
negotiation costs in terms of cross-border legal
transaction costs.5
Search Costs
Due diligence may be heightened in cross-border
exchanges where information asymmetries are
high—this is particularly true in developing econo-
mies with weak formal institutions (Peng, 2003).
Yet in IJVs one of the advantages is the ability for
P3: +
P4: +
P2: +
P1: + Preference of BICA 
over 
Domesc 
Courts
Enforcement Costs
Instuonal Voids Search and Negoaon 
Costs
Proﬁle, Size, Duraon
Instuonal Borrowing
Figure 1 Research model.
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foreign MNEs to delay final decisions about acqui-
sition while gathering information (Chen & Hen-
nart, 2004). Search costs will arise when (1)
choosing legal representation and (2) choosing
the place of enforcement because these are for-
ward-looking concerns that partners are likely to
consider ex ante. In BICA, unlike domestic courts,
firms are free to choose legal representation (Heu-
man, 2003; Redfern et al., 2009). For instance, in
China, foreign lawyers are not allowed to represent
the foreign MNE in court proceedings (Lapre`s,
2009). For the foreign MNE, this increases search
costs because it requires the selection and retention
of a local (Chinese) lawyer. Ironically, retention
agreements for a local (Chinese) lawyer are addi-
tional formal contracts—in this case between the
foreign MNE and the Chinese lawyer. Search costs
may increase because the foreign MNE is unable to
safeguard against potential opportunism associated
with the retention agreement with the Chinese
lawyer, and adding another formal contract will be
time consuming and costly (Argyres & Mayer, 2007;
Schepker et al., 2014). In contrast, the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC) allows a foreign lawyer to
represent the foreign MNE in BICA proceedings in
China (Lapre`s, 2009). As a result, despite China’s
well-documented weak rule of law, BICA can lower
the search costs for partnering with a host firm in
China. This is critical because the bulk of FDI into
China has taken the form of IJVs, thus underscor-
ing the important but previously under-appreciated
role played by BICA (Heye, 2004).
In addition, BICA provides multiple forums for
enforcement (Heuman, 2003; Redfern et al., 2009).
If IJV partner firms are uncertain about BICA
enforcement in one country, they can ‘‘shop’’ for
other enforcement locations. Unlike court deci-
sions that are enforceable only in the jurisdiction of
one court system (e.g., Chinese court decisions are
not enforceable in France), BICA awards are enforce-
able in the 152 countries that signed the New York
Convention (1958) (see Appendix). For instance, in
the BICA concerning the IJV disputes between
Danone (France) and Wahaha (China), the winning
firm could therefore go to France, China, or any of
the other 150 countries to enforce the BICA award.
In this way, IJV partners may engage in enforce-
ment forum shopping to reduce enforcement
uncertainty and thus overcome a major limitation
of IJV contract under the assumption of one court
for enforcement.
Negotiation Costs
IJVs also tend to face significant negotiation costs,
which BICA may reduce. Here, we will focus on (1)
the location of the resolution process, (2) the
language of the process, and (3) the concept of
liabilities of foreignness as it relates to domestic
courts and BICA.
Location-specific issues may arise during a con-
flict ranging from travel to the potential disadvan-
tages of being in different time zones. These
disadvantages stem from distance created by for-
eignness (Zaheer, 1995). Travel expenses should
account for both the mode of travel (such as air and
ground) and accommodations necessary while
negotiators are away from home. The hassles
associated with travel often prove to be a determi-
nant of location selection (Schotter & Beamish,
2013).
Time zones and geographic distance tend to be
another major concern (Zaheer, 1995). When
extensive travel is necessary, negotiators who have
been traveling may require time to recuperate. In
addition, negotiation may increase coordination
costs within the firm, where the distant represen-
tatives may need information, instruction, and
Table 3 Large arbitration institutions and a description of parties from weak institutions using BICA
Institute Name International
Chamber of
Commerce
(ICC, Paris)
International
Centre for
Settlement of
Investment
Disputes (ICSID,
Washington, DC)
Singapore
International
Arbitration
Commission
(SIAC, Singapore)
Stockholm
Chamber of
Commerce
(SCC,
Stockholm)
International
Center
for Dispute
Resolution (ICDR,
New York)
Specialization Commercial Foreign Investment Commercial Commercial Commercial
Parties from Weak
Institutional
Environments
53% 77% 77% 41% 62%
Sources: ICC (www.iccwbo.org), SIAC (www.siac.org.sg), SCC (www.sccinstitute.com), ICDR (www.icdr.org), and ICSID (icsid.worldbank.org).
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authorization from the home country office that is
in a different time zone. With this in mind, the
dispute resolution coordination costs may be
jointly reduced if both partners a priori choose a
dispute resolution location that is geographically
midway. This compromise may allow both firms to
avoid home court advantages relating to proximity
to headquarters (Davidson, 2010; Park, 1998).
Countries and cities may also create supportive
BICA policies to attract firms seeking a neutral
ground (Drahozal, 2004). Countries such as Sweden
are very successful in attracting BICA business. In
addition, such competition is filtering down to the
city level as the major global cities compete for
BICA-related business. For example, in 2013, New
York City hosted 1,165 BICA cases, Paris 767, and
Miami 128 (Olson, 2014). These major BICA hubs
also had high numbers in 2014: London (301 BICA
cases), Singapore (259), and Stockholm (203)
(Croft, 2014). In other words, certain countries
and cities around the world market their institu-
tions to be borrowed, thus helping firms reduce
costs.
One advantage of a middle ground is the
expressed willingness for both sides to share the
burden of legal intervention in the cross-border
transaction relationship (Aghion & Holden, 2011;
Spier, 1992), which may be a critical element of
building and maintaining trust in the relationship
(Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Gulati, 1995). Legal
theory suggests that the process of BICA relative to
court systems may range from adversarial to con-
structive. Relative to court proceedings that tend to
be adversarial, BICA may be more constructive and
more likely to maintain the IJV relationship (Lu-
mineau & Oxley, 2012). Legal intervention is a
necessary part of the contracting process that need
not be adversarial (Spier, 1992). Hence if the goal of
BICA is to clarify contractual points or resolve
emerging problems through a neutral third party to
continue the IJV relationship, sharing particular
costs reinforces the relationship and thus reduces
negotiation costs (Drahozal, 2009). Thus a middle
ground may help maintain the relationship, which
suggests that the anticipated shadow of the future
may drive some IJV partners to choose BICA over
domestic courts (Eisenberg & Miller, 2007).
The choice of language governing the contract
may also increase negotiation costs. Domestic
courts will use the official languages of the coun-
tries. For the foreign MNE, choosing domestic
courts will bear this added cost of language. BICA
may provide some relief for the foreign MNE
through the choice of language of the proceedings
and arbitrator. When IJV partners communicate in
different languages, the choice of multilingual
arbitrators may provide an advantage unavailable
in domestic courts. In addition, arbitrators may ask
for clarifications in other languages (Heuman,
2003). The proposed advantages are not costless,
however. For the foreign MNE, the costs of lan-
guage in the domestic court are likely to be high,
because language may be a barrier of communica-
tion in court, with local lawyers, with communica-
tions outside the court during the exchange of
documents, and so on. The foreign MNE must also
pay for a translator during BICA or find an arbitra-
tor who is multilingual if the parties choose a
language other than the foreign MNE’s native
tongue. Thus due to language concerns, the foreign
MNE may prefer BICA.
A middle ground may also have implications for
liabilities of foreignness that the foreign MNE
experiences in domestic courts in terms of national
sentiment. Assuming that domestic courts are
completely neutral and a conflict between the
foreign MNE and the host firm can be objectively
decided, the domestic populace fanned by the
domestic media may still be biased against the
foreign MNE (Stevens et al., 2016; Zaheer, 1995).
Therefore foreign MNEs may prefer BICA because it
may mitigate liabilities of foreignness that stem
from national sentiment. Overall:
Proposition 3: High search and negotiation
costs intensify institutional borrowing for firms
forming an IJV to choose binding international
commercial arbitration as opposed to domestic
courts in the host country of the MNE.
THE ROLE OF IJV PARTNERS
The choice of BICA versus domestic courts funda-
mentally lies within the powers of the IJV partners.
We argue that the following partner-related attri-
butes sit at the intersection of transaction costs and
the choice of including BICA in a contract: (1) IJV
partner size, (2) IJV size, (3) IJV duration, and (4)
IJV partner profile.
IJV Partner Size
There are two points related to the size of the
partners that are relevant when considering legal
resources and enforcement costs. Firm size is a
proxy for legal resources, such that larger firms
have developed legal capabilities such as in-house
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counsel and large legal departments (Bagley, 2008;
Brenner, 2011). Under the assumption that firms
can learn to contract and better leverage their legal
resources, larger IJV partners may have a stronger
preference for BICA (Argyres & Mayer, 2007;
Bagley, 2008; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Most large
firms (foreign and domestic) report a preference for
BICA in cross-border deals (Mistelis, 2013). In turn,
this suggests that smaller firms may not have the
same opportunities as their larger counterparts,
making BICA an expensive, unattractive option.
Thus small and large firms’ preference for BICA or
domestic courts may differ.
IJV Size
The relative size and importance of the IJV may also
drive the attention partners give to these transac-
tion costs. The magnitude of the transaction costs
is likely to increase as the IJV size (value) increases.
As the IJV size increases, sunk costs (credible
commitment to the IJV) increase, creating align-
ment incentives internally, but also highlighting
the mutual hostage nuance of the IJV partners
(Oxley, 1997). As the IJV size increases, both
parties will seek strong enforcement mechanisms
in anticipation of potential breaches.
This also has implications for IJV ownership,
which is likely to influence the costs borne by IJV
partners (Chen & Hennart, 2004). The need for
protecting ownership position and facilitating
changes in ownership as the IJV evolves makes
strong enforcement mechanisms necessary (Beam-
ish & Lupton, 2016; Zhou & Poppo, 2010). Gener-
ally, as ownership increases, the need for
predictable enforcement may increase. Addition-
ally, IJVs with higher potential for change in
ownership and exit options may also drive the IJV
partners to contemplate BICA to overcome increas-
ing enforcement costs (Beamish & Lupton, 2016;
Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2009).
IJV Duration
The duration of IJVs may also influence enforce-
ment costs. On the one hand, when IJVs have a
defined end date, enforcement costs tend to be
higher (Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011). On the other
hand, as IJV duration increases, conflict likelihood
decreases and IJV partners are more likely to resolve
issues without a neutral third party (Lumineau &
Oxley, 2012). In part, IJV partners learn to cooper-
ate (Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Lumineau & Oxley,
2012). Also, as ties between two partners intensify,
the need to rely on external mechanisms may
decrease (Gulati, 1995). Thus, as IJVs’ duration
increases IJV partners may not have the same
priorities. Critically, this suggests that when the
IJV duration is shorter and defined, IJV partners may
be more likely to select BICA over domestic courts
(Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011).
IJV Partner Profile
High profile host firms are attractive to foreign
partners (Shi, Sun, Pinkham, & Peng, 2014). They
tend to be in the best position to possess local
resources. However, in the event that disputes arise
in IJVs, high profile host firms may have tremen-
dous advantages in domestic courts. On the one
hand, domestic courts are likely to side with host
firms (especially national icons) that have strong
domestic reputations. On the other hand, domestic
courts may render a decision in favor of foreign
MNEs, but then refuse to enforce the decision
against host firm assets. In addition, Siegel (2009)
documented an interesting effect of asset move-
ment by host firms out of developing economies. In
other words, host firms (anticipating conflicts) may
move the relevant assets to offshore locations
where domestic courts do not have jurisdiction
(Siegel, 2009). This means that the domestic courts
may have jurisdiction to hear the grievance, but
may not be able to enforce the decision because few
assets are present to seize under their jurisdiction.
This complicates collection on a domestic judg-
ment even if foreign MNEs win. We recognize that
this may be more apparent when host firms have
ties to the government or have government
endorsement, a common mechanism for host
governments to ‘‘support’’ market transactions in
the host market (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). This may
pressure IJV partners to commit to the domestic
court system. However, open government support
for one IJV partner will escalate the need for a
neutral enforcement mechanism for the foreign
MNE. Locations where the growth of the economy
has a strong dependence on government ties and
FDI such as China also tend to promote BICA as a
matter of policy (Drahozal, 2004; Li, 2009). In this
sense, government ties will tend to drive foreign
MNEs to push for the selection of BICA in ex ante
negotiations. Thus:
Proposition 4: Certain IJV attributes—such as
large size of the partner firms, large size of the IJV,
defined duration, and high partner profile—in-
tensify institutional borrowing for firms forming
an IJV to choose binding international commercial
Overcoming institutional voids via arbitration Brian C Pinkham and Mike W Peng
352
Journal of International Business Studies
arbitration as opposed to domestic courts in the
host country of the MNE.
DISCUSSION
Overall, we present a theory of how IJV partner
firms may overcome institutional voids by using
BICA as opposed to domestic courts. By integrating
the legal literature on BICA in IJVs with the
institution-based view, we bring a new perspective
to the mechanisms that may help firms bridge
institutional voids. Given that we know firms have
the ability to borrow institutions, we must ask:
under what conditions will the firm borrow institu-
tions to overcome institutional voids? To begin to
disentangle this complex issue, we identify BICA as
a mechanism that helps reduce some cross-border
transaction costs. We argue that some foreign
MNEs may have a vested interest in avoiding host
country courts, and that BICA allows foreign and
domestic firms engaged in forming IJV relation-
ships to create a neutral ground should conflicts
arise.
Contributions
In our view, at least three contributions to the
institutional voids literature emerge. First, we have
identified and relaxed the assumption of ‘‘one law,
one court in one country’’ that permeates the
contracts literature underlying IJV research (Ar-
gyres & Mayer, 2007; Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Williamson, 1985). By bringing in the legal litera-
ture based on the choice of contract law, we enrich
our understanding of how firms may use law and
enforcement mechanisms beyond the default of
only using local institutions. Second, we contribute
to the discussion on institutional borrowing by
outlining how BICA may help IJV partners bring
strong legal institutions into weak legal institu-
tional environments. In turn, this may reduce
transaction costs for partner firms and address
issues of enforcement when faced with institu-
tional voids in domestic court systems. The adju-
dication mechanism underlying BICA allows the
firms to borrow institutions to overcome weak
enforcement institutions in the host market. Third,
with a focus on IJVs attributes, we begin to explore
the boundaries of our model by developing a more
nuanced approach to our theory of institutional
borrowing and the ability of IJV partners to over-
come institutional voids. We believe this brings us
closer to understanding when IJV partners may
borrow institutions. By leveraging the specific case
of how a specific institution—arbitration—matters,
we have extended and enriched the institution-
based view with a focus on BICA (Blevins,
Moschieri, Pinkham, & Ragozzino, 2016; Meyer &
Peng, 2016; Peng et al., 2008, 2009).
BICA has broad implications for IB and manage-
ment research. Bagley’s (2008) argument that
experience with legal resources may result in firm-
specific capabilities can be extended to expertise in
BICA. The uniformity under the New York Con-
vention and predictability under the auspices of
institutional bodies of experts suggests that BICA
offers an area of concentration for resources (espe-
cially legal expertise) that may otherwise be dis-
persed over many jurisdictions. This may help firms
create more sophisticated and complex contracts
(Reuer & Arin˜o, 2007), or alter the path of learning
about contracting where we may see firms devel-
oping capabilities to use and manage BICA (Argyres
& Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). In addi-
tion, given variations among property rights, the
stability and predictability offered in BICA poten-
tially impact licensing and technology contracts
(Anand & Khanna, 2000). By offering a substitute
for domestic courts, BICA provides a potential
mechanism for institutional borrowing, where
firms may avoid local instability and market failure.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Because BICA is a private dispute resolution system,
it is difficult to empirically observe the disputes and
outcomes. We introduce tightly coupled relation-
ships from the legal literature but there is still a
need for more empirical testing to develop causal
relationships. We encourage future BICA research
to draw on information from established institu-
tions such as the SCC, CIETAC, and ICC. Alterna-
tively, researchers may contact large accounting
and law firms with a BICA-focused practice. A
qualitative approach (with access to these firms)
would greatly enrich our understanding of the
borrowing mechanism related to BICA. Specifically,
our inclusion of aggregate statistics (Tables 2 and 3)
provides a baseline for the use of arbitration, but
elaboration by country, region, and industry would
provide an enriched account of BICA with further
insights.
There is more work to be done surrounding the
IJV. One of the challenges in our article is to bring
in sufficient, generalizable perspectives. We framed
these around the foreign MNE, and included infor-
mation on the relevance of BICA for MNEs from
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weak institutional environments (Table 3). Yet the
legal literature suggests that IJV partners may have
different priorities in terms of (1) enforceability
(finality of the decision), (2) choice of law, and (3)
location of the arbitration (IFC, 2006; Mistelis,
2013). Thus, a focus on host firms in IJVs may
provide further insights on host firms’ unique
interests.
In addition, the foreign MNE and the host firm
are rational partners but only boundedly so. One
such boundary on the rationality in the choice of
BICA will be awareness. The awareness of BICA is
not universal, and many host firms in markets with
weak enforcement institutions may have an inter-
est in learning more about BICA. For instance, a
survey in Ukraine indicates that many small and
medium-sized (domestic) firms were not aware of
BICA (IFC, 2006). For this reason, awareness may
play out differently depending on whether both (or
one of the) firms in the IJV are aware of BICA. It
would be natural in this setting, however, to see
that host firms (rather than foreign MNEs) have a
deeper commitment to domestic courts and there-
fore need more incentives to agree to BICA (Puffer
et al., 2010). One concern may be that the foreign
MNE bringing in a clause like BICA that is not well
understood by the host firm may undermine the
relationship (Beamish & Lupton, 2016). Overall,
the foreign MNE and the local firm essentially are
engaged in a game of negotiations to construct an
IJV, and how this game—in our context with a
focus on whether to choose BICA or domestic
courts—plays out can be fascinating new ground in
future research drawing on game theory.
In addition, a finer-grained approach to partner
selection would be interesting and warranted. We
assumed that partners engage in a discussion around
the inclusion of BICA. There is more work to be
done on the longevity of the IJV, as we only address
the duration of the IJV above. There are interesting
questions that arise when considering the ex ante
discussions of open-ended IJV duration and the
adoption of BICA. While IJV partners may be
together for a long time, they cannot predict with
certainty how long the IJV will endure when
engaged in ex ante discussions (Lumineau & Mal-
hotra, 2011; Lumineau & Oxley, 2012). This begs
the question: how may a cost-based approach
change when looking more deeply into the long-
evity and evolution of the IJV?
In addition, foreign MNEs that require BICA as
part of IJV contracts would not fit in the arguments
here, since we assume that using BICA is a choice.
Beyond the IJV, we may still consider that different
types of governance may have different needs for
BICA. For high-risk cross-border acquisitions, for
instance, the legal literature anecdotally notes that
firms seem to prefer domestic courts (Mistelis,
2013). Yet for other high-risk exchanges such as
technology transfer, BICA is often preferred (Dra-
hozal, 2009).
BICA may also provide an interesting setting for
trust-based studies of contracts (Malhotra & Mur-
nighan, 2002). Recent research on the role of con-
tract and resolution clauses (such as domestic
arbitration clauses) suggests that private forms of
dispute resolution have a different effect on the
interfirm relationship relative to court proceedings
(Harmon, Kim, & Mayer, 2015; Lumineau & Malho-
tra, 2011). To this end, the trust-based contracts
literature has focused on the general, private forum
of dispute resolution, an aggregate measure that may
include dispute resolution forms such as mediation,
arbitration, and conciliation. Given that many firms
openly prefer arbitration in cross-border disputes
(Drahozal, 2009; Mistelis, 2013), future research can
more closely compare court and BICA effects on trust
in the interfirm relationship. In addition, foreign
MNEs and host partners are likely to vary along
contextual (and cultural) competencies that may
relate to the ability to identify and manage institu-
tional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2010; Peng, 2003).
We have engaged in the discussion of a specific
(and critical) subset of IJV partnerships between
one foreign MNE and one host partner firm. Other
notable extensions may include multiple IJV part-
ners and IJV partners that are both foreign to the
host market. In these instances, multinationality
and coordination costs may demand the use of
BICA rather than domestic courts. But, perhaps
more salient in these instances would be the
dilution of local ties to the host market. The
question then becomes whether the choice of BICA
in these instances is driven by institutional voids or
by the fundamental lack of local embeddedness.
Beyond the IJV context, BICA studies can extend
to other conflict settings. First, while we focus on
firm–firm IJVs, a comparison of arbitration of firm–
firm conflicts within national borders (domestic)
and across national borders (international) may be
interesting. Second, we do not address firm–state
conflicts that may be particularly relevant for firms
interested in protecting their investment from
nationalization without compensation (Stevens
et al., 2016). This is a common occurrence as seen
in recent conflicts between multinationals in the
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oil and gas industry and the governments of
Argentina and Venezuela (Pinkham, 2010). Finally,
we have not addressed firm–consumer conflicts. Forc-
ing consumers to accept binding private arbitration
and to forego their rights for court proceedings may
save the firm some transaction costs, but may have
grave ethical (and potentially legal) ramifications.
How a foreign MNE uses arbitration to deal with host
country consumers remains a fascinating area for
future research. Overall, while we have concentrated
on how BICA can facilitate conflict resolution in
IJVs—a relatively focused domain—in a broad sense
whether arbitration undermines domestic law by
substituting law with secret arbitration remains a
worthwhile endeavor for future research.
CONCLUSION
Leveraging and extending the institution-based
view, our central argument is that IJV partners
may overcome institutional voids by borrowing
enforcement mechanism via BICA that offers an
alternative to domestic courts. Going above and
beyond the typical setting of ‘‘one law, one court in
one country’’ that characterizes much of the con-
tracts literature, BICA can be used as a fundamental
building block for facilitating market exchanges in
the face of institutional voids. In conclusion, using
BICA reduces cross-border transaction costs because
it enables the borrowing of enforcement institu-
tions as an alternative to domestic court systems.
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NOTES
1Arbitration is ‘‘a non-judicial proceeding in which
disputing parties submit their conflict to an impartial
person or group of persons for a final and binding
resolution instead of to a judicial tribunal and must be
invoked by voluntary agreement of the parties …
arbitrators may consider rules of contract law, prac-
tice, custom, and general principles of equity, as well
as personal concepts of justice, public policy, logic
and ethics’’ (Galanter, 2001: 586). International
commercial arbitration provides a neutral arbitrator
(Berger, 1993), avoids ‘‘hometown justice’’ (Dra-
hozal, 2009; Park, 1998), and results in an award (a
final, binding decision) that is enforceable across
borders where a domestic court judgment is not
(Bu¨hring-Uhle, 1996).
2We recognize that enforcement is a multifaceted
concept, and we use the term ‘‘enforcement’’ in three
ways. First, we draw on the law literature to narrowly
define enforcement as the enforcement of the IJV
contract—if the partners use BICA, the underlying
assumption in the enforcement of the BICA award is
also relevant (Mistelis, 2013). Second, we adopt the
term enforcement mechanisms from the transaction
costs and institutional voids literatures to describe
BICA and domestic court systems (Khanna & Palepu,
2010; Williamson, 1985). Third, we adopt Wil-
liamson’s definition of enforcement costs to develop
our theoretical model and describe the differences in
the mechanisms (Williamson, 1975, 1985).
3This is true of both developed and developing
economies. The institutions affecting market exchange
in the EU, for instance, are quite different from those of
the US (La Porta et al., 1997). Similarly, differences
exist between developed and developing economies
and among developing economies (Meyer et al.,
2009; Peng et al., 2009).
4We thank the editor and the reviewers for their
guidance in developing the conceptual model.
5Hennart (1989) divided cross-border transaction
costs into market and control costs. Market costs are
associated with exchange, and control costs are
associated with integration of the target exchange
partner across borders. When control costs are less
than market costs, firms are likely to integrate to draw
on internal exchange advantages (Brouthers & Hen-
nart, 2007; Buckley & Casson, 1976). We focus on
market costs, but not control costs.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 152 member countries belonging to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (as of October 15, 2014)
Afghanistan Czech Republic Latvia Republic of Korea
Albania Denmark Lebanon Republic of Moldova
Algeria Djibouti Lesotho Romania
Antigua and Barbuda Dominica Liberia Russian Federation
Argentina Dominican Republic Liechtenstein Rwanda
Armenia Ecuador Lithuania Saint Vincent
Australia Egypt Luxembourg San Marino
Austria El Salvador Macedonia Sao Tome and Principe
Azerbaijan Estonia Madagascar Saudi Arabia
Bahamas Fiji Malaysia Senegal
Bahrain Finland Mali Serbia
Bangladesh France Malta Singapore
Barbados Gabon Marshall Islands Slovakia
Belarus Georgia Mauritania Slovenia
Belgium Germany Mauritius South Africa
Benin Ghana Mexico Spain
Bhutan Greece Monaco Sri Lanka
Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia Sweden
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Montenegro Switzerland
Botswana Haiti Morocco Syria
Brazil Holy See Mozambique Tajikistan
Brunei Darussalam Honduras Myanmar Tanzania
Bulgaria Hungary Nepal Thailand
Burkina Faso Iceland Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Burundi India New Zealand Tunisia
Cambodia Indonesia Nicaragua Turkey
Cameroon Iran Niger Uganda
Canada Ireland Nigeria Ukraine
Central African Republic Israel Norway United Arab Emirates
Chile Italy Oman United Kingdom
China Jamaica Pakistan United States
Colombia Japan Panama Uruguay
Cook Islands Jordan Paraguay Uzbekistan
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Peru Venezuela
Coˆte d’Ivoire Kenya Philippines Vietnam
Croatia Kuwait Poland Zambia
Cuba Kyrgyzstan Portugal Zimbabwe
Cyprus Laos Qatar
Note: For example, an Algerian firm and a Belgian firm could take an award from a Chinese BICA and enforce it in any of the remaining 151 countries
where the losing firm has assets.
Overcoming institutional voids via arbitration Brian C Pinkham and Mike W Peng
358
Journal of International Business Studies
Accepted by Suzana Rodrigues, Guest Editor, 28 June 2016. This article has been with the authors for three revisions.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Brian C. Pinkham (PhD, University of Texas at
Dallas) is an Assistant Professor of International
Business at Ivey Business School, Western University.
His research interests are global strategy, interna-
tional business, and emerging economies, with a
focus on the institution-based view. He has published
articles in leading journals such as the Academy of
Management Perspectives, Entrepreneurship: Theory &
Practice, Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies, Journal
of World Business, and Organizational Dynamics.
Mike W. Peng (PhD, University of Washington) is
the Jindal Chair of Global Strategy at the Jindal
School of Management, University of Texas at
Dallas. He is a winner of a National Science Foun-
dation Career Award and a fellow of the Academy
of International Business. His research interests are
global strategy, international business, and emerg-
ing economies, with a focus on the institution-
based view. He has authored Global Strategy, Global
Business, and Global, and published numerous
articles in leading journals such as the Academy of
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review,
Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of
World Business, and Strategic Management Journal.
This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Overcoming institutional voids via arbitration Brian C Pinkham and Mike W Peng
359
Journal of International Business Studies
